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CHILLED BIRD: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
IN THE EIGHTIES
by
Kenneth E. Kulzick*
Amy D. Rogue**
"Only the birds sing free" is a saying frequently heard in law of-
fices when speaking about the necessity of billing for legal services. In
recent cases, the cost of defending media interests in right of publicity,
defamation, right to privacy, and copyright infringement litigation has
soared into the six figure range.I Practically speaking, many media cli-
ents want to know whether the form and substance of their publications
can result in legal claims that cannot be terminated by a relatively inex-
pensive motion prior to a protracted trial. In the real world, freedom of
expression requires consideration of not only the marketplace of ideas
and access to the marketplace, but also awareness of the legal costs
arising from exercise of first amendment rights-the cost of going to
market.
From the point of view of litigators who defend the media's exer-
cise of first amendment rights, several troublesome trends have
emerged during the past decade. The purpose of this article is to con-
sider recent developments in the areas of right of publicity, privacy,
defamation, and copyright law that have chilled expression and have
resulted in fewer cases being terminated short of full trial.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Although the right of publicity has in the past been confused with
the right to privacy,2 recent decisions have distinguished the two.
Commercial rights, analogous to those protected by tortious misappro-
priation, have been protected by the so-called right of publicity and
* Ph.D. Marquette University; J.D. University of California at Los Angeles; Member,
California Bar.
** A.B. Duke University; M.Phil. Cambridge University, England; J.D. Duke Univer-
sity; Member, California Bar.
The substantial work of writing this article is properly attributed to Amy D. Hogue,
with introduction and editorial supervision by Kenneth E. Kulzick.
1. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (litigation costs reached and threatened to
surpass six figures even before trial on the merits).
2. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
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sometimes held to be a form of property which survives the death of
the celebrity originator. Until recently, however, the clash with first
amendment values implicit in this emerging doctrine of the right of
publicity has been largely ignored.3
The right of publicity exercised by a celebrity during his lifetime
poses a threat to free expression only when the public's right to follow
newsworthy events threatens to appropriate some or all of the commer-
cial value of the celebrity's act. People have the right to know about
the public figures of contemporary history and performers are entitled
to earn a living. Much of the reward reaped by famous persons in ap-
pearances before the public is attributable to news and feature coverage
by the media. Sports figures, for example, could not command high
fees for speaking appearances were it not for extensive coverage of
their personal and professional lives by the press and other communi-
cations media. If every celebrity could monopolize his publicity until
eternity, democracy would be divorced from entertainment, and ex-
pression would likely be chilled.
The flow of information essential to a free society must be sup-
ported by a privilege of newsworthiness so that information sought by
the public is freely available.4 If the right of publicity rests upon no-
tions of commercial advantage, then expression only in direct competi-
tion with a celebrity's income should be subject to liability. News about
a celebrity must not be confused with theft of his act for financial gain.
Reporters and biographers are entitled to disseminate ideas and expres-
sion even if they are original only in the research and extraction of facts
worthy of comment. Just as the law of copyright carves out a statutory
privilege for fair use,5 the right of publicity must make some allowance
for the first amendment. As long as reportage does not directly dimin-
3. Although one Justice of the Supreme Court addressed the issue in a dissenting opin-
ion, the most thorough discussion to date was advanced in a concurring opinion by Chief
Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 579 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring).
4. The law of copyright accounts for this privilege in its fair use exception to the copy-
right holder's monopoly. See, e.g., Italian Book Corp. v. ABC, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no infringement of plaintiff's copyrighted song in a news story
about a parade which included film of musicians on a float playing plaintiff's song); Time
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that sketches repro-
ducing plaintiff's copyrighted film of the assassination of President Kennedy that were pub-
lished in Six Seconds in Dallas, a study of the assassination, were a fair use of the film). See
notes 85-91 supra and accompanying text.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). See note 85 infra.
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ish a celebrity's financial return, it should be permitted in the name of
liberty.
Few of these considerations have been recognized in the right of
publicity cases. For example, in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. ,6
Larry Harmon Pictures Corporation sued Hal Roach Studios, Inc.
claiming to own the exclusive right to the names, likenesses, characters,
and characterization of the famous comedians, Stan Laurel and Oliver
Hardy. Defendant Hal Roach Studios, who owned the copyright to
Laurel and Hardy motion pictures, claimed to be the successor in inter-
est to employment contracts with the two comedians, and as such, had
conveyed exclusive merchandising rights in Laurel and Hardy to de-
fendant Feiner.
To the extent that the parties' dispute centered on merchandising
rights to things which looked like Laurel and Hardy rather than expres-
sion pertaining to the comedy duo, first amendment rights were not
meaningfully involved. On the other hand, plaintiff's alleged exclusive
right to exploit characters or characterizations of Laurel and Hardy
even after the comedians' deaths, poses serious constitutional ques-
tions: Would a biographer have to purchase certain rights of publicity
before writing life stories of the two comedians? Would a cartoonist
have to pay for the right to create a Saturday morning series based on
characters similar to Laurel and Hardy? Would a producer be required
to compensate the comedians when he makes a Hollywood documen-
tary based on uncopyrighted footage or on a made-for-television
fictionalization of the comedians' off-camera exploits? Although the
law of copyright rarely prohibits biography based on copied facts or
characters7 and in fiction generally does not protect characters from
infringement,8 their protection under a theory of right of publicity is an
open question.
The danger exists, however, that the first amendment values im-
plicit in the fair use exception to copyright law will be eroded by liabil-
6. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Norman v. CBS, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). But see Miller v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (finding infringement of the research of plain-
tiff's biographical work in defendant's docudrama based on the same facts); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding infringement of
plaintiff's biography of Lenny Bruce in defendant's film biography, Dirtymouth).
8. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930),
ceri. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
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ity imposed under the guise of a purported right of publicity. In
essence, a new copyright monopoly threatens to be created with no ba-
sis in the copyright clause 9 or its supporting legislation." This danger
is exacerbated by decisions such as Price, involving Laurel and Hardy,
in which the right of publicity was held to survive the death of the
personality portrayed. In Price, the court reasoned that because the
right of publicity is commercial in nature and unrelated to personal
injury to feelings, "[t]here appears to be no logical reason to terminate
this right upon death of the person protected."" In so concluding,
however, the court ignored constitutional considerations and, perhaps
because the dispute centered upon merchandising rights, failed to con-
sider the impact an extension of this monopoly would have on creative
expression.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 12 also held that the right of pub-
licity as exploited in merchandising rights survives a celebrity's death.
Factors Etc., however, arguably required some acknowledgment of
first amendment considerations because the disputed item was a poster
announcing the death of Elvis Presley. Plaintiff had created and ex-
ploited the Presley persona from 1956 until the singer's death in 1977,
and claimed exclusive ownership to all commercial rights in the
singer's name or likeness. Although defendant purchased the copy-
righted photograph for its poster from an Atlanta newspaper, the court
held that conversion of the photo from a newspaper to a poster offered
for sale stripped the photo of any privilege of newsworthiness. 13 This
distinction, based on the difference between a photograph printed on
newsprint and a photograph printed on fine poster paper, not only be-
lies the Chinese adage that a picture tells a thousand words, but also
suggests that non-traditional or artistic conveyors of information enjoy
less first amendment protection than their more traditional competitors.
The court's acknowledgment that a privilege of newsworthiness
might come into play suggests that first amendment considerations are
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
11. 400 F. Supp. at 844.
12. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See also Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., [1980] COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) % 25,176 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1980)
(granting summary judgment to Factors Etc. in line with the principles announced by the
Second Circuit).
13. 579 F.2d at 221. The court distinguished Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59
Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968), which held that a presidential election poster of
comedian Pat Paulsen was privileged under the first amendment and refused to award him
damages for his claimed right of publicity. The Factors court held that the Elvis Presley
poster was "not privileged as a newsworthy event." 579 F.2d at 222.
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pertinent in right of publicity cases although the appropriate analysis is
yet to be fully revealed. The Pat Paulsen case, 4 in which a court up-
held defendant's right to distribute a photograph of the comedian on a
"Paulsen for President" poster during the comedian's apparently face-
tious candidacy for president, has often been cited with Factors Etc. to
illustrate the confusion among right of publicity cases. Examination of
the two precedents in light of Supreme Court discussion of the first
amendment in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 15 provides a
plausible although unsound basis for distinction: non-political expres-
sion may enjoy less first amendment protection than political expres-
sion. 16
A second right of publicity case involving the Presley heirs, Mem-
phis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. ,17 helps to clear the
confusion by relying, at least partly, upon the first amendment in refus-
ing to recognize an inheritable right of publicity. Even though the mer-
chandising rights at issue in Memphis Development involved a bronze
statue of Presley to be erected in the city of Memphis and the sale of
miniature replicas of that statue, the court simply was not persuaded
that "making the right of publicity inheritable would. . . significantly
inspire the creative endeavors of individuals in our society."' 8 Among
the "practical problems of judicial line-drawing" weighed by the court
14. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968). See
note 13 supra.
15. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
16. Young implicitly rejects the reasoning of Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972), and other cases which state that government regulation of the content of
speech was impermissible under the first amendment. According to Young, "within-the area
of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different governmental response."
427 U.S. at 66. For example, "the content of a particular advertisement may determine the
extent of its protection." Id at 68. The Court indicated that artistic speech which is erotic in
nature does not receive as much protection as political speech:
Moreover, even though we recognize that the first amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is
manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.
Id at 70.
For New York decisions to the same effect, see Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.
Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341,
244 N.E.2d 250,296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968). In Hicks, the heirs and assignees of Agatha Chris-
tie sued to enjoin distribution of the movie and novel Agatha, which presented fictional
accounts of an actual incident in Christie's life. The court balanced society's interest in the
protection of speech with the commercial interests of those seeking to restrain speech and
concluded that society's interest should prevail. Plaintifi's right of publicity was therefore
denied. 464 F. Supp. at 433.
17. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 959.
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was the following question: "[a]t what point does the right [of public-
ity] collide with the right of free expression guaranteed by the first
amendment?"'I9 Although the Memphis Development court did not ex-
plicitly answer that question, it looked to the law of defamation for
guidance and acknowledged the role of the media in both defamation
and right of publicity actions.20 With language reminiscent of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan2' and its progeny, the court tipped the scales
to favor free expression over personal advantage.
In California, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to rec-
ognize a right of publicity surviving death, although the extent to which
the first amendment provides the rationale for these decisions is un-
clear. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,22 the widow and surviving son of
Bela Lugosi claimed that Universal had appropriated their inherited
property. The issue was whether Lugosi's employment contracts with
Universal effected a grant of merchandising rights to his portrayal as
Count Dracula. The California Supreme Court agreed with Professor
Prosser that "there is no common law right of action for a publication
concerning one who is already dead,"23 suggesting that "[i]f rights to
the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property never exercised dur-
ing the lifetime of their creators were to survive their death, neither
society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights
to the fruits of his own labor would be served."24 Justice Mosk, in his
concurring opinion, similarly noted the decision's "salutory tendency
. . to encourage the free dissemination of ideas." He observed that
"[t]o approve such a bonanza [to Lugosi's successors] on a newly cre-
ated cause of action . . . ill serves the principles of free expression
19. Id
20. Id In concluding that the right of publicity was not inheritable, the Sixth Circuit
relied on an analogy to the law of defamation:
There is no right of action for defamation after death. . . . The two interests that
support the inheritability of the right of publicity, namely, the "effort and creativ-
ity" and the "hopes and expectations" of the decedent, would also support an ac-
tion for libel or slander for destruction of name and reputation after death.
Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient to overcome the common law policy
terminating the action for defamation upon death.
.. . The intangible and shifting nature of fame and celebrity status, the pres-
ence of widespread public and press participation in its creation, the unusual
psychic rewards and income that often flow from it during life and the fact that it
may be created by bad as well as good conduct combine to create serious reserva-
tions about making fame the permanent right of a few individuals to the exclusion
of the general public.
Id (emphasis added).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1966). See note 50 infra.
22. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
23. Id at 820, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
24. Id at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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... ,25 Chief Justice Bird, in dissent, argued for the creation of a
right of publicity valid during the lifetime of the originator and fifty
years thereafter. 26 Presumably because rights to merchandising rather
than expression were involved in Lugosi, the Chief Justice did not ad-
dress first amendment issues.
However, in a concurring opinion to Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions,27 the Chief Justice undertook an expanded analysis of the
first amendment implications of the right of publicity. In Guglielmi, the
nephew of Rudolph Valentino sued the producers of a fictionalized bi-
ographical drama which aired on national television. Plaintiff sought
an injunction and damages claiming that this unauthorized use of Va-
lentino's life story in a fictional work misappropriated their right of
publicity. Although the majority sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's
complaint, Chief Justice Bird concluded that the complaint stated a
cause of action because it alleged (1) that plaintiff inherited Valentino's
right to publicity and (2) that the alleged appropriation occurred within
fifty years of plaintiffs death. 8 Chief Justice Bird argued, however,
that the first amendment and article 1, section 2 of the California Con-
stitution precluded a finding of liability.29
According to Chief Justice Bird, entertainment and works of
fiction are entitled to the same constitutional protection as ideas, politi-
cal treatises, or news stories.30 Moreover, the right to publicity may not
be used as a shield against caricature, parody, or satire.3' Bird asserted
that "prominence invites creative comment" and warned that "the
range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced if prominent
persons in the present and recent past were forbidden topics for the
25. Id at 828, 603 P.2d at 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
26. Id at 850-51, 603 P.2d at 448-49, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
27. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
28. Id at 864, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
29. Id at 865-68, 603 P.2d at 458-60, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355-57.
30. In Guglielmi, the Chief Justice stressed the importance of constitutionally protected
freedom of expression for works of fiction:
Using fiction as a vehicle, commentaries on our values, habits, customs, laws,
prejudices, justice, heritage and future are frequently expressed. What may be dif-
ficult to communicate or understand when factually reported may be poignant or
powerful if offered in satire, science fiction or parable. Indeed, Dickens and Dos-
toevski may well have written more trenchant and comprehensive commentaries
on their times than any factual recitation could ever yield. Such authors are no less
entitled to express their views than the town crier with the daily news or the philos-
opher with his discourse on the nature of justice. Even the author who creates
distracting tales for amusement is entitled to constitutional protection.
Id at 867-68, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357. But see Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66-70 (1976).
31. 25 Cal. 3d at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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imaginations of authors of fiction."32 Thus, on the basis of these first
amendment considerations, Bird would have sustained the demurrer to
plaintiff's claim, both as to the motion picture drama and the accompa-
nying advertisements.
The Bird doctrine of publicity limits liability to cases in which ap-
propriation takes the form of things rather than words. Recovery in
Lugosi was warranted because appropriation took the form of products
such as "plastic toy pencil sharpeners, . . . , soap products, candy dis-
pensers" and other items which "unlike motion pictures, are not vehi-
cles through which ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated. 33
This approach is similar to the "definitional balancing" tests employed
by the United States Supreme Court in first amendment cases.' 4 The
analysis defines the expression appropriated as either protected by the
first amendment or not; if it is protected speech, recovery under a the-
ory of right of publicity or appropriation of name or likeness is unavail-
able. Where the expressive element in the disputed product is slight-
as in a Dracula pencil sharpener-the first amendment arguably does
not prevent the depicted celebrity, his heirs, or assigns from monopoliz-
ing the commercial return. Where the expressive element is manifest,
as in a motion picture biography or in historic fiction, the public's right
to free expression prevents monopolization of the commercial rights.
As in the fair use exception to copyright law, the courts must
"subordinate the private interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and indus-
try.
' 35
The Bird analysis advances the developing law of publicity in
three important respects. First, it explicitly addresses the first amend-
ment issues underlying the right of publicity. Second, a framework of
"definitional balancing" helpful to courts deciding claims advanced
under the right of publicity is presented and may be employed whether
or not the right is held to be descendible. Third, because the analysis
rests upon principles analogous to those of copyright law, the more in-
tegrated and consistent body of law proposed would reduce the uncer-
tainty and fear of liability now facing creative writers.
It is somewhat difficult, however, to harmonize Chief Justice Bird's
32. Id
33. Id at 874, 603 P.2d at 463, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
34. See generally Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180, 1184 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nim-
mer].
35. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
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concurrence with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Zacchini v. Scriops-Howard Broadcasting Co. 36 In Zacchini, a fifteen
second human cannonball act was shown in its entirety in the course of
a television news story about the county fair in which Zacchini ap-
peared. The Court concluded that the broadcast posed a substantial
threat to the economic value of Zacchini's act37 and held that liability
for this appropriation could be imposed in spite of the first amend-
ment." Although the Court confirmed that "entertainment, as well as
news, enjoys First Amendment protection," and that "entertainment it-
self can be important news,"39 it ultimately decided that the broadcast
of the entire act simply went too far. The Court asserted that requiring
compensation of performers whose acts are broadcast in entirety would
not stifle information about the act, because "neither the public nor
respondent will be deprived of his benefit of petitioner's performance
as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recog-
nized."40
If Zacchini had been decided strictly according to Chief Justice
Bird's analysis, the result would have been different. Although the
human cannonball act itself consisted of conduct without words and
was only minimally expressive,4" its broadcast in the course of a news
story about the county fair in which the act appeared arguably con-
veyed information worthy of first amendment protection. Thus, even if
we accept the Supreme Court's finding that the broadcast diminished
Zacehini's financial reward, the Bird analysis would preclude compen-
sation for broadcast of the act.
The Court's finding that the broadcast adversely affected
Zacchini's success in the entertainment market is open to question.
The audience for local television news is not identical to the audience
for live human cannonball acts. Indeed, the argument that the news
broadcast in fact provided free publicity for Zacchini is more persua-
sive. If the act was newsworthy, as the majority conceded in
Zacchini,4 2 and if defendant's medium of communication was not in
36. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
37. Id at 575.
38. Id at 578-79.
39. Id at 578.
40. Id
41. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (statute forbidding destruction
of draft cards held not unconstitutional as abridging free speech where conduct combined
both speech and nonspeech elements and a "sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element. . . justiffied] incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms").
42. 433 U.S. at 569.
19801
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4 REVIEW
competition with Zacchini, the award of damages to Zacchini was in
error.
The opinion of the dissenting justices in Zacchini is more easily
harmonized with Chief Justice Bird's position. This opinion by Justice
Powell charges the majority with deciding only the narrow case before
the court with the "repeated incantation of a single formula: 'a per-
former's entire act.' "4 Although Powell does not address the danger
to creative expression implicit in the majority opinion,44 his proposed
analysis is in accord with Chief Justice Bird's opinion. Powell would
hold that "the first amendment protects the station from a 'right of pub-
licity' or 'appropriation' suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff
that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or com-
mercial exploitation." 45 Having chosen to make his performance news-
worthy, Zacchini could not complain of routine news coverage.46
The scant majority in Zacchini47 hints that a showing of less than
the entire act would have eliminated a finding of commercial harm to
the plaintiff.48 Because the opinion applied a specific Ohio statute to
appropriation of an entire act, its general precedential value is minimal.
The courts may follow the analysis of either Chief Justice Bird or Jus-
tice Powell in any right to publicity case in which only a portion of the
act has been appropriated. In short, creative expression as well as news
reporting may be preserved in all but the extraordinary case in which
an entire act is appropriated.49
43. 433 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
44. But see Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 P.2d 454,
455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
45. 433 U.S. at 581 (footnote omitted).
46. Id at 582.
47. Five justices joined the majority opinion and four dissented.
48. "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that
are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent." 433 U.S. at 574-75.
49. Some support for Zacehini may be found in copyright cases in which the defense of
fair use is disallowed on the grounds that too much of the infringed work was reproduced by
the infringer. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc,, 479 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979), provides a good example. MGM claimed that defendants' musi-
cal play, Scarlett Fever, infringed their motion picture, Gone with the Wind. Defendants
admitted that their play was based on Gone with the Wind, but argued that their work was a
parody falling within the fair use exception to the copyright monopoly. The court found the
story line nearly identical and the dialogue almost verbatim. Id at 356. Further, the court
found that Searlett Fever failed to parody or satirize any significant part of Gone with the
Wind. Id at 351-58. In short, although Scarlet Fever differed somewhat in tone from Gone
with the Wind, the court found that defendants'had essentially appropriated plaintiff's entire
work.
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II. PRIVACY AND DEFAMATION
Claims of invasion of privacy or defamation arising out of creative
expression also threaten to have a chilling effect on freedom of expres-
sion. Biographies or motion picture presentations of contemporary his-
tory are most vulnerable to claims from living persons offended by
depiction of their lives. Although the law regarding factual accounts of
public figures is fairly well established,50 the law regarding fictional ac-
counts is less clear.
51
Time, Inc. v. Hill52 did not squarely test the issue of first amend-
ment protection for fictional accounts of newsworthy stories. In Hill,
Life Magazine published an article about the play, The Desperate
Hours. The play was based on a kidnapping incident involving plain-
tiff Hill and his family, but did not mention the family by name. The
magazine article, however, suggested that the play was an accurate ac-
count of the incident when, in fact, fictional but non-defamatory
changes had been made. 3 The court of appeals awarded damages to
Hill for invasion of his privacy. The Supreme Court overturned this
award holding that liability could be found only if the article had been
published with knowing or reckless falsity.54 Thus, although Hill in-
volved a fictional version of the kidnapping, the holding was limited to
the apparently factual news story.
Soon after Hill was decided, it was incorrectly applied to fiction
under the New York Privacy Act.55 Warren Spahn, a baseball player
of considerable reknown, sued a biographer who had included dia-
logue, imaginary incidents, thoughts, and feelings in his portrayal of
Spahn. The trial court found gross errors of fact and "all pervasive
50. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1966). In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, an elected official brought suit against a newspaper claiming that he had been
libeled by an advertisement appearing in the newspaper. The Supreme Court held that
under the first and fourteenth amendments, the public official was not entitled to damages
for defamation relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice," that is that
the statement was made "with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
it was true or false." id at 279-80. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
51. See generally Hill, Defamation and Privacy, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205 (1976).
52. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
53. Id at 379. The novel and play depicted a family of four held hostage by three
escaped prisoners who beat the son and father and subjected the daughter to sexual insults.
In fact, James Hill and his family had been held hostage by prisoners but were released
unharmed. Id at 378.
54. 385 U.S. at 397-98.
55. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832
(1967).
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distortions, inaccuracies, [and] invented dialogue .. . ."56 The court
awarded damages to Spahn and granted an injunction preventing fur-
ther publication and distribution of the book. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed, finding that this knowing fictionalization "would
amount to granting a literary license which is not only unnecessary to
the protection of free speech but destructive of an individual's right-
albeit a limited one in the case of a public figure-to be free of the
commercial exploitation of his name and personality."57 Although the
biography apparently did not announce in bold type that the dialogue
and thoughts attributed to Spabn were fictional, the fanciful nature of
the portrayal must have been obvious from the presentation and mar-
keting of the book for juvenile readers. Ironically, the court considered
the finding that defendants "had no intention to follow the facts con-
cerning plaintiff's life, except in broad outline and to the extent that the
facts readily supplied a dramatic portrayal attractive to the juvenile
reader," to be an admission of malice.58
The dissenting opinion by Judge Bergan pointedly noted the inap-
propriateness of applying the Hill analysis to a fictional work in that
"[all fiction is false in the literal sense that it is imagined rather than
actual. ' 59 The decision in Spahn and its inevitable chilling effect upon
creative writing was foreseen by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion to Time, Inc. v. Hill.6"
In contrast to Spahn, the court in Leopold v. Levin6 1 observed the
distinction noted by Judge Bergan and Justice Douglas, and found that
the novel Compulsion and the play and motion picture based on that
novel did not invade the privacy of the protagonist, Nathan Leopold.
The plot in Compulsion was based on a murder committed by plaintiff
Leopold. Although fictitious names were used, the book cover stated
that the novel was "suggested by" the infamous act. Leopold's claim
for damages from the exploitation of his name, likeness, and personal-
ity for commercial gain in "knowingly fictionalized accounts" of his
56. 43 Misc. 2d 219, 230, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 541 (1964).
57. 21 N.Y.2d at 129, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
58. Id at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
59. Id at 131, 233 N.E.2d at 845, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
60. 385 U.S. at 401-02. Justice Douglas concluded that a fictionalized treatment of a
news event such as the Hill kidnapping was "as much in the public domain as would be a
watercolor of the assassination of a public official." Id at 401.
61. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970). See also Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962) (holding that a fictionalized article about
Janet Leigh and her childhood boyfriend neither defamed nor invaded the privacy of the
actress).
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private life was denied.62 Noting that Leopold was a public figure and
that the novel was derived from matters of public record, the court spe-
cifically distinguished Hill on the grounds that that decision involved a
"false but purportedly factual account of the Hill incident," whereas in
Leopold the novel was "evidently fictional" although "suggested by"
the crime of the plaintiff.63 The Illinois court distinguished Spahn on
the basis of the particular New York statute under which that action
was brought.64
The significant clarification of the law contributed by Leopold v.
Levin may have been erased or at least smudged by a recent decision of
the California Court of Appeal. In Bindrim v. Mitchell,65 the court ex-
tended the reasoning of the Spahn majority to the law of defamation.
Novelist Gwen Davis Mitchell attended a nude encounter session di-
rected by psychologist Paul Bindrim. Before attending the session,
Mitchell signed an agreement not to "take photographs, write articles,
or in any manner disclose who has attended the workshop or what has
transpired. 66 Mitchell did, however, publish a novel, Touching, which
portrayed characters participating in a nude encounter session.
Although the book was marketed as a work of fiction, Bindrim
claimed that he was libeled by the author's characterization of "Dr.
Simon Herford" as the psychiatrist who directed the nude encounter
sessions. In the novel, Dr. Herford used profanity to bully a minister
into bringing his wife to the encounter sessions. Tapes of the actual
encounter sessions recorded by Dr. Bindrim showed that Bindrim po-
litely tried to persuade a minister to bring his wife to the sessions.67
Instead of treating Mitchell's more dramatic exchange as an author's
fictional prerogative, the court found the innuendo to be defamatory
and proceeded to apply the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard of
malice. 6' Even though Dr. Herford was described in the novel as a "fat
Santa Claus type with long white hair, white sideburns, a cherubic rosy
face and rosy forearms," whereas Bindrim was clean shaven with short
hair, the court found the similarities between the two characters to be
clear.69
62. The theoretical basis for Leopold's suit apparently rested upon the right of publicity
as well as privacy.
63. 45 Ill. 2d at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
64. Id at 445-46, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
65. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
66. Id at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
67. Id at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
68. See note 50 supra.
69. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75-76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
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The test for identifying the plaintiff used by the Bindrim court was
whether a third person who knew Bindrim could reasonably identify
him with the fictional character.70 This standard would effectively pro-
hibit creative expression derived from contemporary reality which in
any way disparaged a fictional character derived from an actual person.
As long as some witness could be persuaded to testify that he identified
plaintiff as the character in the book, liability could be found. Any
novel traceable to reality would automatically fail the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan test of knowing falsity.7' First amendment protection
for fiction would, therefore, be substantially weaker than protection for
news or nonfiction, and the chilling effect foreseen by Justice Douglas
in Time, Inc. v. Hill would ensue.72 At the very least, this chilling effect
would extend to works of fiction about innovative occupations. In
broader terms, the holding would stifle unflattering but fictional ac-
counts inspired by any private or public figure.73
Although the California Supreme Court denied a hearing of the
Bindrim decision,74 the concurring opinion of Justice Bird in Guglielmi
v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions75 pointedly undercuts the conclusions
of the Bindrim court.76 The Bindrim decision may be only an unfortu-
nate aberration in first amendment adjudication. It affects creative ex-
pression within the area of communication most protected by the first
amendment--discourse about contemporary events vital to an in-
70. Id at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
71. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 129, 233 N.E.2d 840, 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1967)
(Bergan, J., dissenting).
72. See note 60 supra.
73. Justice Files, dissenting in Bindrim, noted that the analytical problem with the ma-
jority opinion was "that it brands a novel as libelous because it is 'false,' i.e., fiction; and
infers 'actual malice' from the fact that the author and publisher knew it was not a true
representation of plaintiff." Moreover, the constitutional concern was "the chilling effect
upon the publisher of any novel critical of any occupational practice inviting litigation on
the theory 'when you criticize my occupation, you libel me."' 92 Cal. App. 3d at 89, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Files, P.J., dissenting).
74. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari, with three justices dissent-
ing. 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
75. See discussion in text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
76. In Guglielmi, Chief Justice Bird commented:
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in fictional works.
Fiction writers may be able to more persuasively, or more accurately, express
themselves by weaving into the tale persons or events familiar to their readers. The
choice is theirs. No author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or
characters wholly divorced from reality. Surely, the range of free expression would
be meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past were
forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction.
25 Cal. 3d at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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formed populace. Taken seriously, the decision would subject even
novels or motion pictures about the presidency to liability because a
living president would undoubtedly be identified by at least some read-
ers or viewers.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW
With rare exceptions, the common law of copyright has developed
without fair regard for the first amendment issues underlying court de-
cisions.77 These first amendment considerations enter the analysis of a
copyright infringement claim, at least implicitly, in three distinct issues:
the issue of protectibility, the idea/expression dichotomy, and the fair
use exception. However, unless the courts use these grounds to dispose
of invalid copyright claims upcn motion, the expensive process of liti-
gation will chill expression that the first amendment was designed to
protect.
A court should decide at the motion stage whether the allegedly
copied scenes deserve copyright protection or are in the public domain.
Stock words and phrases, cliches, and other standard elements of genre
films or fiction are not protected by copyright law.78 Thus, the court in
Alexander v. Haley7 9 correctly granted summary judgment against the
author of Jubilee who claimed infringement of her novel by Alex
Haley's celebrated novel and television series, Roots. Both works de-
scribed the toils of slavery, with the consequent similarities of historical
and factual themes, folk customs, scenes afaire, clich~d language, and
77. See generally Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 320 (1979). But see Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
78. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l., 403 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (C.D.
Cal. 1975) (finding no infringement of the character Regan or the special effects used in
plaintifis film, The Exorcist, in defendant's film, Beyond the Door, and accepting defend-
ant's argument that "the use of flickering lights, raucous 'haunted-house type' noises, flying
bodies and objects about a room, levitation and the changing of human features from placid
to gruesome are theatrical tricks which have for many years been used in other films and
stage plays"); Bevan v. CBS, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding no in-
fringement of plaintiff's play, Stalag 17, in defendant's television series Hogan's Heroes be-
cause the only similarities were "stock items, characteristic of the POW camp genre of
literature"); Warshawsky v. Carter, 132 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (D.D.C. 1955) (finding no in-
fringement between two novels about women who become President of the United States
because the similarities "are those which would normally occur in two stories dealing with a
woman becoming president. ... ). Butsee Goodson-Todman Enterprises Ltd. v. Kellogg,
Co., 513 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) (reversing summary judgment that found no infringement
of plaintifi's game show format of To Tell The Truth in defendant's cereal commercial, Know
Your Tiger, because the idea rather than its expression was used).
79. 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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metaphors. Similarly, the court in Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop 80 affirmed the dismissal of an action claiming infringement
of a children's story, My Mother Is the Most Beautiful Woman in the
World. The evidence showed that both stories had been derived from
folklore of Russian or European origin. Despite the substantial simi-
larity of the two works, the court concluded that defendant's story was
a derivative work "substantially copied from a prior work in the public
domain" and not protected by copyright.8 ' Alexander and Reyher cor-
rectly mark the perimeters of copyright protection. To assure that
hackneyed themes are not protected at the expense of discouraging the
artful portrayal of a common theme, a court must first examine the
similarities and prevent recovery for elements in the public domain.
Second, the trial court must examine the alleged similarities and
decide whether the defendant has taken only the idea rather than the
expression from plaintiff. Ideas are not protected by a copyright be-
cause of the obviously oppressive effect a monopoly on ideas would
have on freedom of speech and the press. If only an idea rather than its
expression is common to two works,82 there is no infringement as a
matter of law, and the case should be discarded on motion. For exam-
ple, in Musto v. Meyer,"3 judgment was correctly granted on the plead-
ings. Musto had written and copyrighted a scientific article on the use
of cocaine in the nineteenth century. In the article, he suggested that
Sherlock Holmes and Sigmund Freud were probable users of the drug.
Musto went on to say that during Holmes' disappearance from 1891 to
1894 he received curing treatments from Freud. The defendant explic-
itly acknowledged Musto's article in the preface to his book, The Seven
Percent Solution, from which a film of the same name was derived.
The book and the film, however, greatly expanded the circumstances
suggested by Musto, building a mystery around Holmes' use of cocaine
and his encounter with Sigmund Freud. Accordingly, the court found
no infringement, holding that ideas, basic plots, and isolated incidents
80. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 950 (1976).
81. Id at 90.
82. See generally Nimmer, supra note 34, at 1189-93.
83. 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'dmem., 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). A similar
case, Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures, 3 MEDIA L. RPTR. (BNA) 1774 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
could have been decided without the necessity of a trial. In Rokeach, a professor of psychol-
ogy sought damages from the distributors of a motion picture, claiming infringement of his
scholarly study, The Three Christs of Ypsilanti. The disputed motion picture, and the book
and play upon which it was based, excerpted verbatim lines of dialogue among three mental
patients presented in Rokeach's scholarly work who were under the delusion that they were
Christ. The court held that the motion picture had taken only the idea of a confrontation
among deluded persons rather than the expression.
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are not protectible as a matter of law.84
The third basis for disposition of an infringement action on a mo-
tion lies in the fair use exception to the copyright monopoly. Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, this common law exception was restated with
no intention to freeze the doctrine to the existing precedents.85 Al-
though the statute makes no reference to the first amendment, a
number of courts have balanced first amendment considerations
against the interests of the copyright holder in adjudicating the fair use
exception where the copied material was newsworthy or biographical
information. Perhaps the best example of such a case is Rosemont En-
terprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 86 In Rosemont, associates of
Howard Hughes obtained the copyright to a magazine article about
Hughes and sued to enjoin publication of a Hughes biography claiming
infringement of copyright. The court did not address the distressing
implication that the Hughes interests sought total suppression of infor-
mation about Hughes. Instead, the court stated that competing biogra-
phies enjoy a preferred position in copyright adjudication.87
A balancing test was also employed to determine fair use in Time
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.88 At issue was the deliberate copying
of the copyrighted Zapruder film of the assassination of President Ken-
nedy wherein exact sketches of certain frames of the Zapruder film
were included in the copier's book, Six Seconds in Dallas. Although
84. 434 F. Supp. at 36.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) states:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
86. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
87. In balancing the equities, the court concluded that the public interest should prevail
over any damage to the owners of the copyright:
Biographies, of course, are fundamentally personal histories and it is both rea-
sonable and customary for biographers to refer to and utilize earlier works dealing
with the subject of the work and occasionally to quote directly from such works.
This practice is permitted because of the public benefit in encouraging the develop-
ment of historical and biographical works and their public distribution, e.g., so
"that the world may not be deprived of improvements or the progress of the courts
be retarded."
Id at 307-09.
88. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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evidence of copying and substantial similarity was abundant, the court
found this use to be "fair."89 As in Rosemont, the court balanced the
public interest in discussion of the film against the copyright holder's
interest in capturing financial return.9" The court accordingly granted
summary judgment based on its finding that sketches copied from the
Zapruder film constituted a fair use of the film.9' As a matter of law,
the copying was not subject to liability.
Thus, protectibility, the idea/expression dichotomy, and fair use
are questions of law that can be determined prior to trial on motions
for dismissal or summary judgment. If they are not treated as analyti-
cally distinct from the question of infringement, confusing and incon-
sistent precedents are probable. Moreover, if the question of
infringement is not circumscribed by these three considerations, first
amendment considerations will be given short shrift. The consequen-
tial chilling effect on creative expression will particularly affect writers
in the film industry.
For example, a production company intending to produce a film of
a particular genre, such as science fiction, generally accepts submissions
from a variety of writers. Similarities among the submissions are inevi-
table. Space vehicles, robots, advanced weaponry such as lasers, and
remote planets with evil humanoid inhabitants are likely to recur in
each submission. Despite these similarities, one submission may be re-
markably superior to the others and more worthy of production. But if
selection of the superior script opens the production company to myr-
iad claims of infringement as to the stock paraphernalia of science
fiction, and if these essentially nonactionable claims proceed to trial,
the cost of legal defense will force production companies to limit sub-
missions ab initio. As a result, creative expression will be discouraged
to the detriment of the writers and the public.92
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products Division is a good example of
a case decided at trial which should have been dismissed upon mo-
tion.94 In Ideal Toy, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that its
89. Id at 146.
90. Id
91. Id
92. But see Berman & Boxer, Copyright Infringement ofAudiovisual Works and Charac-
ters, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1979).
93. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
94. But see Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., No. 78-2437 (C.D. Cal.
August 22, 1980) (granting partial summary judgment to defendant; defendant's motion pic-
ture Battlestar Gallactica not found substantially similar to plaintiffs motion picture Star
Wars, despite presence of helmeted space figures, X-shaped fighter planes making abrupt
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toys produced under the trademark "Star Team" did not infringe
Twentieth Century-Fox's copyright of Star Wars characters, or the toy
characters produced by Kenner as Fox's licensee. Although both sets
of characters had elements in common, the court found they were not
substantially similar under the lay observer test of copyright infringe-
ment. The court went on to find, irrespective of any similarity, that
although the toy company sought to use the themes of Star Wars, the
theme of a black-robed, helmeted figure in outer-space in conflict with
humanoid and non-humanoid robots is not protectible.95 This finding
of unprotectibility as a matter of law could have supported judgment
without the expense of trial. Such costly failures to dispose of the ac-
tion on motion harms the public as well as the copyright holders.
Perhaps the court's reluctance in Ideal Toy to reach its decision
before trial stems from the uncertain state of the law regarding the pro-
tectibility of characters. Thus far, two tests have been advanced. In
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. ,96 the "Sam Spade" case, the
court suggested that copyright protection is available only when a char-
acter "really constitutes the story being told" and is not merely a
"chessman" or "vehicle" of the plot.97 On the other hand, Judge
Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 98 proposed a test
of protectibility depending on the degree to which the character has
been developed.99 Under either test, however, few characters are wor-
thy of protection. The copyright holder's character must be extraordi-
narily distinguished to be protected, and the usual rules of non-
protectibility would prevent liability whenever the copied character is
derived from a character accessible to both writers. Most importantly,
both tests present questions of law susceptible to determination before
trial.
jetplane-like movements, and other elements of the science fiction genre in the public do-
main).
95. 443 F. Supp. at 304.
96. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
97. Id at 950.
98. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
99. Judge Hand concluded that the "less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted." Id. at 121. For example:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer
might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not
be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail
to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became
amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in
the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Dar-
win's Theory of the Origin of Species.
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Professor Nimmer and other authorities' 00 suggest that graphic
characters are most worthy of copyright protection. The "Sam Spade"
test' 0' would probably protect animated characters such as Bugs Bunny
or Mickey Mouse whose appearance and personality dominate the
stock stories in which they appear.0 2 The Learned Hand test 10 3 would
offer equivalent protection to these characters simply because their ap-
pearance as well as their personalities are well developed. The fact that
these characters are animated father than filmed human characters
makes them particularly definable; they are not literary characters por-
trayed by an actor but illustrations qua illustrations, delineated by a
finite number of hand drawn strokes.
Even with regard to filmed graphic characters, however, a court
must be on guard to disregard similarities which amount to unpro-
tected stock elements of all cartoon figures. Otherwise, there is a dan-
ger that copyright protection of one cat or mouse will chill exploitation
of the most popular children's themes. The recent case of UnitedArtists
Corp. v. Ford Motor Co. , o illustrates the sometimes subtle distinctions
between characters that a court must make in order to preserve creative
expression. United Artists owned the copyright to the Pink Panther, an
animated character used in two motion pictures. United Artists sued
Ford Motor Company alleging that the animated cat used to advertise
the Lincoln-Mercury line of cars infringed its copyright. In light of the
necessary similarities as to ears, tails, whiskers, and so on, the court had
to consider whether the more distinctive characteristics of the Pink
Panther had been copied. Cats are common subjects for animation;
Felix the Cat, Top Cat, Snagglepuss, Tom from Tom and Jerry, Sylves-
ter, and many others had been created before either the Pink Panther
or the Lincoln-Mercury cat took shape. The court, therefore, compared
the two characters as they appeared "in their totality," finding that the
use of top hats, canes, and policemen's hats are stock props in anima-
tion and that the "double bounce" form of movement is a standard
animation ploy.105 Noting that both characters had human features,
such as stomachs lighter in color than their bodies, and slender legs, the
100. Nimmer, supra note 34, at 1197; H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 39-41 (1979).
101. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
102. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (finding copyright infringe-
ment of Disney's Mickey Mouse graphic character in defendant's graphically identical char-
acter that differed as to plot, theme, and character).
103. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
104. 483 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
105. Id at 95.
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court concluded that the similarities did not suggest copying and "even
if they did that they are not of such magnitude as to constitute an in-
fringement."' 1 6 In short, the similarities between the two cats could be
dismissed as elements in the public domain, unprotected as a matter of
law.
In contrast, the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Production,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 107 did not discuss the extent to which any of
the similarities between the disputed characters were unprotected as a
matter of law. Evidence of copying and of abundant similarities was
carefully detailed by the court; but in its haste to conclude that an ordi-
nary observer would not distinguish between the two sets of characters,
the court never asked whether the similarities were protected. 0 8 The
court's assertion thai a jury could certainly find these similarities of
expression substantial only underscores its misunderstanding. The
point is that however similar the sets of characters may be, copyright
law does not protect the hackneyed expression of common themes. To
find infringement because the works similarly depict a castle, a talking
tree, or characters with large Charlie Brown style heads forever limits
the scope of creative expression of such details.
It is unfortunate that in cases such as Krofft, where the imitation
may seem to be deliberate, the defendant carries the burden of advanc-
ing arguments in support of free expression and the first amendment.
The inclination from the bench may well be to balance the equities
between the parties without regard for the constitutional issue which is
entailed in any decision involving expression. 0 9 In the long run, how-
106. Id at 96.
107. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976).
108. Examination of the similarities perceived by the court, however, reveals fairly stan-
dard children's fare:
The "Living Island" locale of Pufnstuf and "McDonaldland" are both imagi-
nary worlds inhabited by anthromorphic [sic] plants and animals and other fanci-
ful creatures. The dominant topographical features of the locales are the same:
trees, caves, a pond, a road, a castle. Both works featuri a forest with talking trees
that have human faces and characteristics. The characters are also similar. Both
lands are governed by mayors who have disproportionately large round heads
dominated by long wide mouths. They are assisted by "Keystone cop" characters.
Both lands feature strikingly similar crazy scientists and a multi-armed evil crea-
ture.
Id at 1167 n.9.
109. One commentator has suggested that the burden of proof be reversed in infringe-
ment cases to account for first amendment concerns. See Rosenfield, Constitutional Dimen-
sions of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790 (1975):
Without its constitutional dimension and protection, fair use has been relegated to
the status of an affirmative defense, with the user being required to carry the bur-
den of proof that the use was not an actionable infringement. Thus, the whole
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ever, both the writers and the viewing public will suffer from the inevi-
table chilling effect wrought by overbroad construction of the copyright
monopoly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trend of judicial decisions in the areas of right of publicity,
privacy, defamation, and copyright law threatens to chill creative ex-
pression either directly, by imposing liability on expression which
should be protected, or indirectly, by raising the cost of defending mer-
itless claims. The emerging right of publicity poses a monopoly on ex-
pression akin to copyright, but with no defense of fair use to safeguard
first amendment guarantees. Privacy and defamation cases which con-
tinue to impose liability against creators of fiction may restrict motion
pictures and novels based on the reality of contemporary history to trite
themes and hackneyed characters. Courts deciding copyright infringe-
ment cases may further deplete our creative resources by failing to
avoid costly litigation with timely pretrial decisions of law.
Viewed together, these trends are indeed alarming to motion pic-
ture, publishing, and broadcast companies forced to tailor their script
and editorial decisions to the evanescent line between protected and
unprotected speech. This chill on creativity is costly not only in legal
fees but in the diminution of expression caused by disregard for first
amendment considerations in early stages of litigation.
defense of the public interest and constitutional right is thrown on the alleged in-
fringer.
Id at 804.
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